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Christoph Royen 
EXTENSION OF THE EU ANO NATO TOWAROS THE EAST 
ANO THE GROWING TOGETHER OF EUROPE 
In the last weeks before lhe NA TO Summil in Brussels 011 10th 
! anuary 1994 the number of opinions and items for discussion 011 lhe 
queslion of the expansion of the North Atlaotic AlIiance particularly lO the 
States of Central Eastern Europe (Poland, the Slovak and Czech Republics 
and Hungary) rase sharply, The unexpeeted success of the neo-Faseist «Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia» under its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 
Russian parliamentary elections on 12th Oecember 1993 made a particular 
êOntribution to this_ Amo!lg lhe man)' aggressive statements by Zhirinovsky, 
obove ali his c1aim thal it would be right to reinstale the borders of the 
Russian Empire in 1917 must have caused alarm in Poland and in lhe 
three Baltic States, This further boosted their pressure for participation 
in the proteetion provided by NATO ('1, 
Thc governments of the Western AlIiancc are for the moment howc' 
\cr unwilling to decide on opening up NATO in lavour of a certa in grour 
af states [lS a priority. 
In this erities primarily sec a questionable consideration for President 
ROI'is Ycltsin. The lalter, and also Foreign Ministcr Kosyrev and Oefence 
Ministe]' Graehev have in recent months several times deeisive!y tumed 
against the entry of the Central European former member states of lhe 
Warsaw Paet into NATO. Aceording to the views of the Russian Govern-
ment, this would bc a diseriminatory exelusion of Russia, which would 
weaken democratie forces and only favour the opponents of reform, 
The current debates are without exeeption suffering from the fact 
lhat they anIl' piare the yes ar no to NATO expansion at the eenU·e. 
(I) Even observcl's who nol 1011g ago were slill inclined LO oppose c"ccssive disquic( 
have bccn led to change thcir vicws by thc oulcome of thc Russian c1cctions. See for cxamplc 
lhe artide by Adam Kr:'l'minski "Czji Zachód znowu nas zdradzih>, in Polityka, n." 49. 
-J.-J2·1993. pages 1/23. wlth his commcnts published three wed;s luler: Dje neue ll~\Itschen 
Tlinc. in Dic Zcil. n." 52. 24-12-19Q3. pnge 1. 
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without being able to state in concrete terms why úlis should be offered 
or in contrast why it couldbe harrnful. 
Making this topic so absolute and so narrow will necessarily give 
the rejected Central Eastem European and Baltic states the bitter feeling 
oi having to Iive in a grey area or buffer zone and be sacrificed where 
possible in the interests of larger neighbours «(New Yalta>,) ('). Mean-
while, in Moscow, it is felt that the successful action of their own diplomacy 
must be certified ('). 
On the other hand, ít would be a malter for the West to make it 
clear that the argumentation of the Russian President and his supporters 
is in no way convincing and should therefore be rejected. However, there 
is justification for the hesitations of the Westem Alliance on expansion 
in a necessary broader analytical approach, which is concemed with the 
continuing integration of the two halves of Europe artificia!ly separated 
for so longo This approach is presented below. 
DEFINITION OF WESTERN AIMS 
The success of the post-communist transformation processes lies chiefly 
in the development interests of the Westem democracies themselves. These 
democracies need, in Europe and Eurasia, instead of the former opponents 
or future receivers of aid, active partners in tacking together the challenges 
of the 21st century. Of the Westem countries, Germany has, in view of 
its geographical location, a particular rea!istic politica! interest in the 
stabilisation of the democratic structures and the econonlic and social 
rehabilitation of its Eastem neighbours. However, in the European Union, 
after their forthcoming accession, Austria, Sweden and Finland wil1 also 
share this interest. Moreover, Germany has quite specific responsibility 
(2) However, the former Polish Ambassador to the USA, Kazimierz Drievanovski, 
is criticai to the concept of «new Yalta». Wywobanie Duchow, in: Rzeczpospolita, 15-11-
-1993. page 22. 
(3) See Dmitri Gornostaev, Rassija Ekzamenov Sdavat' ne budet, in: Nezavisimaja 
Gazeta. 8-12-1993, page 4; and criticaI against this Vladimir Baranovski, Vnesnepoliti-
ceslkaja pobeda, ebenda. 
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on historical and moral grounds for the smaUer states of Eastem Europe 
which were subject to the communist system as a result of the Second 
World War initiated by the National Socialist Third Reich. It would howe-
ver be of little help to these states if they chiefly rely on the intercession 
of Germany and thus intensified the defensive distmst of. France and 
other southem members of the European Union. In the longer term, Germany's 
Eastern neighbours will in any case revitalise traditional partnerships with 
other countries, to avoid unilateral dependencies. 
When discussing Westem aims, which are to be achieved by «Eastem 
extension» of the EU and NATO, it is not really a malter of ideological 
confirmation of the triumph over the communist system ar merely the 
creation of larger markets. Nor indeed is it sufficient to cite the strengthening 
of the «North-Eastem» wing of the EU, the gaining of a geopolitical central 
position for Germany or a containment of news dangers emanating in 
future fram Russia as Westem motives. At the heart of the malter, it is 
more a case of whether and how the «Eastern extensiom> can contribute 
to stabilisation and the achievement of the political and economic trans-
formation in the post-communist stales of Communist System Central Easlern 
Europe, and so ali members of lhe EU and NATO musl deal with this 
unanimously as a joint lask. 
If and insofar as this core question is to be answered in the affirmative, 
the existing members of the EU and NATO must realise that they have to 
make a sacrifice in solidarity (the historie «equalisation of burdens») and 
the ideas entertained up to 1989 on the further development of their 
links must be partially revised. This realisation is however still missing 
in the govemments and in the societies of the West. Otherwise it would 
be clear that it cannot simply be a malter for examining and deterrnining 
the achievement of «readiness for accession» unilaterally defined in the 
West in the form of the full «aquis communautaire» at a point X in time. 
What is required is rather support for the transformation processes in the 
phase of preparation for accession and then, after accession, possibly 
granting the new members easier conditions for some considerable time. 
AI the same time, it must be obviously pointed out open1y and without 
reservations that it would not help either the old members or the candidates 
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for accession if the burdens of the EU (') and NATO associated with the 
prcparatioll ar the entry af new members \Vere to become 50 onerous 
that the tv/o associatio115 were no longer viable and felI apal'l. 
TRANSFORMA TIO 'I ANO Tllr PRIOR/Tl' rOli OprN/Nr; UP 
TO TIfE EU 
Thc transformation of the post-communist systcm above all calls for 
internaI polítical 8nd ecollomic-social rcconstruction. For this pUl'po:,c, anel 
also to Qvcrcome thc thinking in spheres of nalionalistic sovcrei~nty, the 
<.lpí'l"oach to and participation in the intcgration af the EU can obviousl~,' 
l1lake " l1luch broader and deeper contribution lhan the NATO dclenec 
alliancc. An extension of NATO towards lhe East serves, according to the 
l"uIes, to securc the transformation \vhich lws begull against threals through 
externaI powers and forces. Only to this extent can one speak of an internai 
poliey eHecl of accession lo NATO, \Vhctl it can help in dissel1linating 
cxpcriences and modcls for the incorporatioo of armed military forces in 
.i plural'stic democracy and makc lhem fruitful. The assortion oecasionally 
hcard in Eastern Europe, and ulso brought fonvard by Wcslern authors C). 
t11at NATO offcrs its members valuablc assistance in building dcmocratic 
~tructures, scems in contra5t to be nt thc lcn~t contrived. and in SOi11e case:;. 
IGreccc 1967-1974, ['ol·tugal IIp lop 1975, 2nd Turkey) it is demonstrably 
incorrcct. Prioritisation in terms of time for an extcnsian af NATO towards 
lhe East would thcrefore bc incorrect \Vith regard to transformation policy. 
I t cOlllJ only bc justificd ir on externai threat eOlllJ be made aI least plau-
sible in lhe forcsceab1c future. This i8 however precisely what is missing 
50 rar (for fllrther details, see last Section). 
With regard to the contribution of EU membership 10 internai Irans-
1'01'111atio11. it i8 obvious that thcrc should bt: warnings ap:ainst c.\ccssivcly 
(4) Sec the atEempt at financiai cosi assessment parliculal"Y for lhe Polish case, by 
Thicmo \\1. Escr/Martil1 Hallct. Ocr llloglichc Beilrag der [G·Rcgional·polilik bei cincr 
():;I.crweitcrung der EG; Hif[c odc1· HindC1'11is? (Tlle possib!e t:ontl'iburion of EC regional 
polilics in Eastern expansion ar lhe EC: Help OI" hindram;c?). in; C.htl'ul"opu-Wirtsch<lft. 
Vol. 38, n.~ 3 (1993), pagcs 195-217. 
(5) See for il1stam:c lhe Cssay by Ronalc.l D. AS'IIus;UidwrJ L. Kugler/F. Stcphcn 
Lamher!. Building a Ncw NATO. i.n: Foreign ~ffuirs. Vol. 72. n. Q 4 (lc}93L pnges 28-4U. 
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high cxpectations. Above aH. hopcs lhat membership wuuld guétnmlt'c lhe 
IICW ll1emb02r at;c",:~s lO subsidies from lhe coffcrs of the Community would 
bc underst"ndable. but shortsighted. The more dependent a candidate for 
aCl.ç;jS 01' a new membcr is shown to be on conccssions and subsidks [rom 
lhe othei' members, the sooner the dnnger arises 01' insufficient means being 
~Ivailable tu ~UppOl'l the entire transformation process in the past~communist 
zone adequatcly. This means that prospects of extension and accession 
I'í.:quire the candidate lo pJ'Ovidc its own resources for successful transfar~ 
matíol1 to a cel'tain tlegree. In tel'ms af ecallomics. the decisive usefulness of 
membel'ship for transformation cansists of a challenge: the opening up oI' 
frontiers to a common market farces the chunge from the previous egalitarian 
:;ocicty of «l'ealistic socialisl11» to th~ competi tive society of the We.stern 
world. Certainly, the repcatedly observed altempls of the Western EUl'Opean 
~ountl'ies hithel'lO, to block access to their own markets to suppliers from 
countries undergoing transfol'mation precisely where they are competitive 
will thus ceasc. However, participation in the common market, even with 
'iuccessful preparation and with special conditiomi continuing. involves more 
,triet compl1lsion to adart for the cOl1ntry gaining access and hence potentially 
impJl'tJ.nl political and social dynamitc: in contrast to the cxtension to the 
Souõ.h, lhe candidates for accession fl'om the East not only havc to face 
lh!..' 12ncuuntcr with the superiol'. cxp~l'ienC2d participants af the capitalist 
world market, but also, at least provisionally, the internaI stresses associated 
with the lransition from lhe cf.alitarian to the competitive society. To this 
cxtenl thc opening cffect necc.s~arily linked to the prospects of extension 
~\l1J acccssion coukl Jisturb the autonomous contrai 01' the transfonnution 
by the 5tate govcrnment conccrned. When social unrest (sllch as that 01' 
tht: Pollsh r~ll'lne1'!:;) is combined \Vith ideological avel'sion to the introductton 
01' (':11101'e liberah> foreign vallles Hnd f01111S of behaviour (e.g. in lhe 
clericalfnationalistic parties in Poland such as the ZChN). the consequence 
(ould be a change 01' even collapse af the govel'nmcn t. 
COl1vel'sely, it is [lho çvident what negntive consequem:es I11l1st m·isl' 
ror thc image of a government and lhe social acceptance of the transfol'-
ll1atÍon process if in spilc of aIl their 0Wll cffol'ts the community uf 
\Vestcrn countries does not honour thesc cndcavours and ro.:!jects the dccades 
c,1' efforts by the [a5tem Europeans for l1nification with the luckiér pari 
.)i the continent. ali the more 50 afIeI' lhe collapse 01 the tremendou, 
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system and bloc boundaries. In addition, in Westem Europe it is not suffi-
ciently noticed how important participation with equal entitlement and 
equal obligation for Eastem Europeans in consultation and decisions of the 
Westem alliances is for the internaI assimilation processes. As long as 
the forms of participation onIy offer the right to make representations, 
there is no compulsion to take back home and implement what has been 
decided in Brussels with their own active cooperation. This applies above 
ali for those areas in which the transfer is not primarily and immediately 
a question of cost, such as for example in the cultural sector, which in 
a particular way leads to the intemational meeting of people, and further 
in many partial areas of assimilation of laws (such as in procedural law, 
in criminal law and constitutional and administrative law) , but also to 
some extent in the field of united foreign policy. For this reason the objection 
lO the opening up of the EU, alleging that the countries undergoing trans-
formation are for the presenl unable to bear the financiai burdens of the 
joint EU programme, is onIy partially correct and conceals chances for 
integration which are also avaUable. 
THE NEED FOR SELECTIVE OPENING UP OF THE EU 
The decided opponents of extension of the EU and NATO towards 
lhe East not infrequently use the argument that if an extension were to 
b" considered, it would have to include ali post-co=unist states, since 
any limitation would have discriminatory exclusion effects which could 
neither be plausibly justified nor reconciled with the aims of stability and 
freedom for the whole of Europe. On the other hand, some who are verbally 
in favour of expansion can be clearly seen to be searching primarily to 
torpedo the «deepening» of EU integration. The request of the Eastem 
Europeans is used actualiy as a disturbing factor against the objectives of 
the Maastricht progra=e of the EU. The open opponents of any extension 
lowards the East feel once again that this confirms their negative attitude. 
The connection postulated above between transformation and EU mem-
bership therefore demands a praticable middle way between the apparent 
altematives of «ali or nothing». Preferences based on plausible criteria 
must be developed for this purpose, to enable a group of candidates for 
accession to be accepted with priority, or to establish a timed sequence 
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for several groups. However, to avoid the problematical effects of the 
impression that the remaining states undergoing transformation are exclu-
ded and isolated, it will be necessary to offer these too concrete forms 
of support suitable for their situation, extending beyond nonbinding com-
muniques and resolutions. 
li therefore preferred groups are to be defined, a combination of the 
following criteria appears most appropriate: 
- Rewarding services for the evolutionary conquest of the orthodox 
communist system up to 1989. 
- Visible progress and sucess in establishing and stabilising the essen-
tial features of a pluralistic democracy (division of powers, free 
govemment under law /special protection of minorities, a party 
system, and a free press). 
- Traditional closeness and affinity with the political culture of Wes-
tem Europe. 
- The first visible successes in the economic transformation, wbich 
however should not be restricted to the implementation of market 
economy regulative principIes but must also pul a stop to the social 
impoverishment of broad sectors of the population and the increa-
sing uncertainty about the rule of law. 
- Their own efforts in subregional cooperation as a preparation for 
membership of the EU integration. 
This combination leads to a elear preference for the four Visegrád 
states. (If purely eeonomie factors were used, tbis would probably lead 
to a division of the Visegrád group as follows: the Czeeh Republie and 
Hungary would have good prospeets for eandidature, whilst Slovakia and-
in spite of the top position acbieved in 1993 in the eomparison of inereases 
in gross domeslic produet - Poland too would initially have to wait). The 
next group to follow would then be the three Baltic states, apart irom 
the individual case of Slovenia whieh, on account of its direet proximity 
to ltaly and Austria, seareely involves any problems. 
The remaining countries in South-Eastem Europe do not suffer any 
damage from such an order of preference. If for example the Visegrád 
states were similar1y exeluded, their potential would in no way suffice to 
assist the other countries in their transformation. On the other hand, the 
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successes already achievcd by the Viccgrád states anu their subregionul 
alliance introduced in 1990 would even threaten to fali into stagnation 
ar possibly into rcgression. At that lime Brussels wclcomed and encouragou 
the subregional cooperation of Poland. Czechoslovakia and Hungary as un 
important preparatory stage 011 the way to lhe largcr intcgratioll community. 
It is to be rcgretted. insofar us the European Council gave the impl'cssion 
in Copenhagen on 21/22 lunc 199; that in future it wished ali countrics 
with which association agrecments (<<Europc treaties») existed. that is aIsu 
Bulgaria and Romania, to be givcn the same treatment ('). lndeed. since 
the dissolutioll of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1992 it has been observeel 
that the Czech government under Prime Minister V óclov Klaus .tIaches 
little importance to the association of Visegrád states. lt is precisely for 
this reason that the EU should insist on active participation in sub.·egional 
cooperation as an essential requircment for acceptal1ce into lhe larger 
European integl'ation. In general however it is true that setbacks and disap-
polntm.ent would pIace a greater burdcn 011 th~ future prospects for tra115-
fOl'mation in thc coutrlcs which have made the greatest progress than in 
those where so fm no visible pl'ogl'CSS has bcen achicvcd. Ar the ~~lInc 
time the example of successful transformation rewarded by \Vestem Eurupc 
by a:ceptance into the EU would act as ao incentive to other post-com, 
munist countries. 
With this approach, in particular two major graups of states would 
be left bchind, and usefu] concrete alternatives would have to be founJ 
for them in place of the prospects of expansion and actession: the CIS zone 
ond the Balkan ZOile. In spite of considerable problems in the reciprocal 
relations between the CIS cOemtries it still appears quite possible to develop 
satisfactory l'clationships oI' partnership with this «Eurasian» commonwealth 
Df states. In the CIS states thero is at Icast evidence that the initial euphoria 
concerning the independcnce 01' the successor states of the formeI' Soviet 
Union is diminishing and there is a grawing degree of willingness for 
cooperation in the contcxt of the eIS, insofar as Russia does not give in 
tu the temptation to use 1hb willingness to rcinstate its own supremacy. 
Doubts in this cOllnection were recently vai ceei by the Kozakh President 
(Ô) See Sectíon 7 .ti. 01' the pllbli~hed re;'lIlt.,; uI' L0nsultutlon in: EUflJpe-Doruffi<;nL. 
n." 1844/45. 24·6-1993. 
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Nazarbacy who 50 far has cmcrged as the most important non-Russian 
advocatc of closer cooperation within the framework of the CIS, as he 
compar.od the statement by Foreign Minister Kozyrev on the functíon of 
Russia as a protective power for the Russians in the other eIS countries 
\Vith Hitler's role as a protector for the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslova-
kia n. In facto after what is sometimos called the «honey-moon» phase of 
the new foreign policy in Russia by RU'isian critics, lrends have now emer-
ged which would make the l'vloscow distinction betv.reen «far» and «near» 
foreign countries look incrcasillgly ominous, since Russia claims an inter-
nationally recognised speeial regulative role in relation to the latter. Similarly. 
the concept of «ncar» foreign coutries obscures the distinction between 
the ten-itorial arcas of the CIS and the «fomlcr Soviet Union». so that it 
is Idt unelear to what extent the Moscow c!aim is also intended to cover 
the three Baltic states. 
The position in the Balkans is even more difficult; after the chaolie 
dcstl11ction of Yugoslavia, which has brought thc earlier approaches to 
e10ser regional cooperation to nothing. for the moment partial solutions for 
Bulgaria. Maccdonia and Romania and poosibly .Iso for Croatia - where it is 
a180 apparcnt that belonging to the «Roman» sphere af culture does not neces-
sarily offer bettcr prospeets for thc implementation of democratic values 
lhan in the countries af he «Byzantine» tradition - and Mon-tenegro ar 
evcn mercly food aid programmcs for Albania. Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Servia are possibJc. The prospects of the transformations processes ín the 
Ralkan region as a whole are obviously dependent on whcther the brutal 
Jisregard of the principies of democl"acy by the warring parties in the former 
Yugoslavia can be ended and the earlier approaches to cooperalion in the 
llalkan countries can be revived. with the participation of Turkey and Greecc. 
SECURITY FOR EASTERN EUROPE 
[n spite 01' the hardening of the Russian attitude to a possible expansion 
of NATO to Central and Eastcrn Europc which cmerged long before the 
Russian parliamentary eleclions, anel l'egardle~s of the increased urgings af 
(') Scc Frnnkfurtcr AII1:!crncinc Zdtlln~, (RcutcrL 26-II·J993. page 6. 
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the Central Eastern Europeans and the Baltic states for immediate acceptan· 
ce into NATO, the prospects af a solution satisfactory to ali parties are 
not yet entirely blocked. Closer inspection reveals that the fears of Central 
Eastern Europeans and those af the Russians are not sufficiently justified. 
Without exception they are based on general geopolitical considerations or 
historical reminiscences and avoid a concrete statement of the assumed 
hazards which can be discussed. Consequently the following should be 
placed under discussion: 
On the one hand, the Russian assertion as contained in particular in 
an analysis presented in November 1993 by a committee of experts of the 
Russian Externai Intelligence Agency under Yevgeny Primakow (') and 
since then repeated by the Russian President and other leading politicians 
appears higbIy questionable: any advance by NATO as far as the borders 
of Russia or the CIS will be perceived as a threat by the Russian public and 
would demand an expensive reorientation of the Russian defence policy. 
What constitutes the alleged threat through the extended defence alliance 
of democratic states, with which the post.communist Russia still seeks to 
develop broad partnership relations. has however not been substantiated 
anywhere. Rather should it have been expected that the Russian democrats 
would also welcome a decision by the Western alliance to protect the 
sma1Ier countries undergoing transformation against developments which 
would !ikewise bring the future of democracy inta Russia into questiono 
To this extent, the attitude of Yeltsin can only be explained in that 
there are fears in Moscow of being isolated from the rest of Europe if 
NATO is not restructured to form a total European security system ('). 
However, in reality such anxiety about isolation is chiefly based on the 
failure of the internai «Perestroika» and the transformation of Russia which 
have brought most people in the country disappointment. uncertainty and 
bitterness. Neither Gorbachev and his successor Yeltsin, nor the Western 
(') See Izvestija, 26-11-1993, page 4; Nevavisimaja Gazeta 26-11-1993, pages t/3. Such 
topics aIso appear in tbe new Russian military doctrine recentIy established. see published 
extracts in: Izvestija, 18-12-1993. pages 1/4. 
(') See Andrei Kozyrev, «Cto nam delat's NATO?~ (What is NATO doing to us?) 
in Moskovskie Novosti, n." 39, 26-9-1993. page A 7. The statements af two Moscow political 
observers repected in the West, Sergej Karaganov in: Moskovsk.ie Novosti, n.O 38, page A 7. ando 
alexei Arbatov. Tri ugla zrenija na problemu vstuplenija Polli NATO in Nezavisimaja 
Gazeta, lMlO-1993. page 4, also point in the same direction as the Russian Foreign Minister. 
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states have so far to managed develop concepts pointing ·to a praetical way 
of overcoming the burdensome inheritanee of the Soeialist system which 
Russian society ean aeeept and implement. 
Thoughts of assisting Yeltsin and the Russian reformers by tempora-
rily setting aside the expansion of NATO towards the East are threfore 
taking the wrong approaeh. Such consideration can scareely make a con-
tribution to improving the prerequisites for the reforms to succeed ... lnstead 
of this, they send out a problematic signal whieh restriets our thinking to 
outdated categories of «spheres of influence». 
Moreover, the argumentation of the Central Eastem Europeans to date 
is also laeking in substanee. Even a seenario in whieh great Russian Faseists 
in Moscow come into power is far from meaning that a futnre president 
Zhirinovsky could then bring his paranoid annoucements into reality. Today 
the situation is not to be eompared with that in 1939, when Stalin and 
Hitler reached agreement on the division of «Central Europe», nor with 
the situation in 1945, when the soviet eommunists could build on forces 
in the neighbouring Westem states freed from the German yoke who saw 
in the introduetion of soeialism the guarantee of a better futnre in their 
eountries. Each further attempt to reinstate the Russian hegemony and the 
eoordination of Central Eastem Europe whould call for the setting up of 
a purely military regime of oceupation. Before any leadership in Moseow 
eould deeide on this, the political unity and economie power of Russia 
would first have to be regenerated, in order to direct them towards the 
eJimination of the newly achieved independence of the other CIS countries. 
The urging of the Central Eastem Europeans for aecession to NATO is 
also ultimately based on the grounds of finally and permanently over· 
coming the division and isolation from the Westem par! of Europe. This is 
evident from the fact that after the collapse of the communist regime in 
1989, the Central Eastem Europeans first gave priority to the Westem 
European integration of the EC. Only later did it emerge that the Westem 
Europeans are not ready to grant this wish in the next deeade, and where 
possible will seek other reasons for postponing it, and Central Eastem 
Europeans to some extent see membership of NATO as a substitnte whieh 
eould perhaps be aehieved more easily. 
The only region whieh could in faet be endangered by a retnm to 
greater Russian expansion tendeneies is the three Baltic States. The unsolved 
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problem of the Russian minontles in Estonia and Latvia - obviously also 
caused by the Baltic nationalists - 01' lhe conceivable conflicts about Russian 
access to the Kaliningrad area could give opportunities for the military 
supremacy of Russia to come into play, if the Baltic States did not have 
allies standing by Iheir side, 
What conclusions can be drawn from this survey of the security pro-
blem in ~ Eastem part of Europe? 
Firstly Ihere is the malter of the implemelltation of the programme 
on .Partnership for Peace» decided on by NATO in Brussels on lO/lI 
January 1994, which is to revive under ncw auspices the idea initialJy 
emerging in 1991 on lhe creation of the «North AtIantic Cooperation 
Council» (NACC) , to bring togelhel' the Soviet Union and the Central 
Eastern Europeans previously compelled to be aUies and now free to enter 
Ihree-way talks. After the unforeseeable dissolution of the USSR first only 
gave rise to lhe NACC challging into a mere catchment basin for the estate 
of lhe bankrupt soviet system, it is now a matter of creating eloser bilateral 
and subregional multilateral structures for dialogue and cooperation within 
the NACC. The aim of this must be to help in setting aside mutual mistrust 
and promoting lhe beginnings of neighbourly partnership in place of the 
complicated system of exelusions. In particular, dialogue and cooperation 
between Russia and Poland, ar between Russia and the three Baltic states, 
wilh lhe active mediation and pal'ticipation of a few NATO members, 
should be promoted. In Russia there will then at least be a distinction 
between those who were actual1y motivated only by the anxiety concer-
ning isol.tion from Europc, and those who want to retain the soviet and 
lhe pre-soviet imperial zones of influence in Central Eastem Europe and 
in lhe Baltics. And Poland would no tanger need to fear the West abando-
ning it, together with its other Central Eastern European and Ballic neigh-
bours, in a «buffer» or «grey zone». 
Secondly, and above all, Western Europeans must, in spite 01 their 
own internai economic crises which have recentIy become pressing, develop 
more commitment and solidarity together with the USA, to ensure that 
the post-communist translol'mation processes achicve visible success. Th. 
self-satisfied hope at the beginning 01 this decade, that the collapse of 
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communism would automatically bring into play the healing powers of 
democracy and the market , has meanwhile proven to be an illusion. The 
West must finally discard this notion. 
Christoph Royen 
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